In its unanimous June 29 decision in , the U.S Supreme Court disrupted decades of precedent in ruling that, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer that rejects a religious accommodation request on the basis of 鈥渦ndue hardship鈥 must prove a burden well beyond a 鈥渄e minimis cost.鈥 The employer must establish that the rejected accommodation requires 鈥渟ubstantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of [the employer鈥檚] particular business.鈥 The Court further clarified that a negative impact on co-workers resulting from the requested accommodation does not automatically qualify the accommodation as an 鈥渦ndue hardship.鈥 The new test must be satisfied whether the 鈥渟ubstantial increased costs鈥 result from an impact on co-workers or otherwise.
The case concerns a postal worker, Gerald Groff, who objected to working on Sundays due to his religious beliefs. When the U.S. Postal Service鈥檚 attempt to accommodate Groff by facilitating shift swaps eventually failed, Groff received progressive discipline for unexcused absences on his Sunday shifts, ultimately resulting in his resignation. Notably, 骋谤辞蹿蹿鈥檚 assignment to Sunday shifts was not at the discretion of the Postal Service but was done in accordance with an agreement with the union that represented Groff and his peers.
Prior to the Groff decision, federal courts and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had long applied an employer-friendly standard under which a religious accommodation posed an 鈥渦ndue burden鈥 if it imposed 鈥渕ore than a de minimis cost鈥 on the employer. In finding against Groff on the basis that allowing him to take Sundays off would cause an undue hardship to the Postal Service, the district court and Court of Appeals had relied in part on the negative impact that 骋谤辞蹿蹿鈥檚 refusal to work Sundays had on his co-workers, some of whom were forced to work his missed shifts, to find that the relatively light 鈥渄e minimis cost鈥 standard had been met. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard needed to take another look.
How similar facts鈥攐r even these facts鈥攚ill be analyzed by courts under the new standard is difficult to predict. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court expressly declined to provide detailed guidance as to how its new standard should be applied moving forward, leaving that task to the courts and the EEOC. It remanded 骋谤辞蹿蹿鈥檚 case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with its ruling, meaning that even the final outcome of 骋谤辞蹿蹿鈥檚 case remains in doubt.
That said, it is clear that the new standard is significantly more demanding. Among other things, inconvenience to other employees alone may not be enough to constitute an undue burden in every situation. That does not mean that employers must provide any religious accommodation presented (such as missing days of work), regardless of the burden. If the employer is able to find a means of providing an effective accommodation due the religious practice鈥攚hich in this context requires 鈥渆liminating the conflict鈥 between the job requirement and the religious practice鈥攖hen the employer will have met its duty to provide a reasonable accommodation, and the undue hardship may not come into play at all. If there is no reasonable accommodation available, at that point, the undue hardship analysis may become relevant. Employers are well-advised to consult with employment counsel to evaluate potential options.
Along the same lines, because the Court is applying its new standard retroactively, employers that have refused religious accommodations on the basis of undue hardship should consider re-evaluating those decisions with the assistance of counsel to ensure compliance moving forward.
We will be keeping a close eye on how this ruling is addressed by the courts and EEOC, and will keep you posted on any significant developments.
Editor鈥檚 Note: This article was written by and of the law firm Ice Miller LLP and is published by 51风流 with permission. This publication is intended for general information purposes only and does not and is not intended to constitute legal advice. The reader should consult with legal counsel to determine how laws or decisions discussed herein apply to the reader's specific circumstances.